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Symposium: Separation of Powers in
State Constitutional Law
Introduction
Carl T. Bogus*
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and ju-
diciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison):'
In what may be its most important case of the century, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court will decide later this year whether
the principle of separation of powers among the three branches of
government is contained in the Rhode Island Constitution on the
same basis as the United States Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers has always been contro-
versial in Rhode Island. When James Madison penned the state-
ment above, he noted that unlike most of the other states, Rhode
Island might not have adopted the doctrine of separation of powers
since its charter was written before the principle "had become an
object of political attention."2
When the state constitution was drafted in 1843 as a result of
the Dorr Rebellion, separation of powers was still controversial. 3
"The People's Constitution," ratified by the voters in 1841, clearly
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1. The Federalist No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell ed.,
1937).
2. Id. at 247.
3. See Patrick T. Conley, Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 44 R.I. B.J. 9
(1995).
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incorporated the principle of separation of powers. 4 However, the
legislature and the state Supreme Court refused to recognize the
People's Constitution. 5 By using martial law and threatening
political opponents with treason, the legislature ultimately suc-
ceeded in having the electorate ratify a different constitution. 6
That document-which is, perhaps deliberately, vague on the issue
of separation of powers-is the Rhode Island Constitution.
Each side in the debate can point to aspects of the document
that favor its position. Those who argue that the state constitution
recognizes the principle of separation of powers find support, for
example, in Article V, which states: "The powers of the government
shall be distributed into three departments: the legislative, execu-
tive and judicial."7 Those who argue that the legislature is the
dominant branch of government often cite Article VI, Section 10,
which provides: "The general assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this
Constitution."
The current constitutional struggle involves efforts by the
General Assembly to further extend its power into what, in the fed-
eral system, are considered executive functions-most particu-
larly, appointing the officers of regulatory agencies. 9 For example,
the enforcement of environmental laws in Rhode Island is now
split among several agencies, including most prominently the De-
partment of Environmental Management (DEM) and the Coastal
Resources Management Council (CRMC). The General Assembly
is seeking to transfer powers from DEM, which is administered by
a director appointed by the Governor, to CRMC, which is controlled
by a board comprised, in large part, of members of the General As-
sembly and other individuals appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.l0
Some argue that legislative participation in the enforcement of
the law helps to ensure that regulatory agencies enforce the law in
4. William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History 130-31 (1978).
5. See id. at 133.
6. See id.
7. R.I. Const. art. V.
8. Id. art. VI, § 7.
9. See Conley, supra note 3, at 10.
10. See Peter B. Lord, General Assembly Under Siege in Historic Challenge,
Prov. J. Bull., March 30, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 6510744.
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a manner consistent with the public policy." Others contend that
it destroys the checks and balances necessary to prevent power
from being misused. 12
11. See Russel Garland, Almond, Legislators Square Off in Court Case, Prov.
J. Bull., Dec. 28, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 17531644.
12. See Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature Under the
Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road Less Trav-
eled, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
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